Standing Committee F

[Part II]

[Mrs. Marion Roe in the Chair]

Hunting Bill

[continuation from column 584] 
 On resuming—

Rob Marris: I beg to move amendment No. 237, in
clause 13, page 5, line 3, at end insert 
 '; but that is without prejudice to the power of the registrar or the Tribunal to impose under section 17 or 19 such conditions as they think fit'.

Marion Roe: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
 Amendment No. 238, in 
clause 14, page 5, line 30, at end insert— 
 '(6A) Subsections (5) and (6) are without prejudice to the power of the registrar or the Tribunal to impose under section 17 or 19 such conditions as they think fit.'
 Amendment No. 239, in 
clause 15, page 6, line 6, leave out 'or require'. 
Amendment No. 240, in 
clause 17, page 7, line 23, leave out from 'may' to end of line 24.
 Amendment No. 243, in 
clause 19, page 8, line 7, leave out from 'may' to end of line 8.

Rob Marris: I think that I am right in saying that all these amendments stand in my name and those of my hon. Friends. They are probing amendments and I hope that we can deal with them fairly speedily.
 Under clauses 13 and 14, applicants applying for individual or group registration can specify conditions on their applications. Amendments Nos. 237 and 238 simply allow the registrar to specify similar conditions as he or she thinks fit. For example, if the registrar does not think that the application passes the cruelty and utility tests, but would do so in a more limited form, the registrar should be able to make appropriate conditions explicit on the licence. 
 Amendment No. 239 seeks to ensure that the registrar is not required to permit changes to the application prior to its determination, so as to prevent multiple or unnecessary changes and the whole matter getting caught up in bureaucracy. But even if clause 15(2)(c) were so amended, the registrar would be left with the ability to allow necessary amendments. 
 Amendment No. 240 relates to clause 17(5), under which the registrar cannot vary the conditions of an application for registration to ensure that the hunting passes the tests of utility or cruelty in clause 8 without the consent of the applicants, and enables the registrar to make such changes as he or she sees fit, without obtaining the consent of the applicants. 
 Amendment No. 243 relates to clause 19(4) and mirrors what I said about amendment No. 240, 
 enabling the registrar to go ahead without the consent of the applicants. Amendment No. 243 would make a similar change in clause 19(4), so that conditions could be added or varied without the consent of the applicants. That would streamline the application process, and reduce the cost and the bureaucratic burden.

Gregory Barker: Amendments Nos. 237 and 238, which would confirm the power of the registrar or tribunal to vary conditions, do not appear to be very controversial. However, I take exception to amendments Nos. 239, 240 and 243, tabled by the hon. Member for Wolverhampton, South-West. They seem to run contrary to natural justice.
 Once again I must guard against the inherent prejudice against applicants for a licence to hunt that runs with monotonous consistency through the Bill and many Labour amendments. Under amendment No. 239 it would not be possible for regulations to be made requiring a registrar to permit an applicant to amend an application before it was determined. In the interests of decency, fair play, common sense, efficiency and natural justice, the amendment should be withdrawn. Thousands of people—hundreds of hunts, as well as gamekeepers, farmers and even shepherds—will be applying to register, and because of that the registration process is bound to be liable to delay. 
 Even if the Minister is able to set up a terrifically efficient apparatus, and there is not a great delay, it would seem prudent at least to guard against that possibility. To that end, applicants should be able to amend their applications after submitting them and before they are considered. That is not least because new evidence on hunting is continually coming to light—evidence based on research, of the sort that Burns called for on page 155 of his report, and which, as the Minister has repeatedly told us, he expects. Any registrar or tribunal should take that into account. 
 For example, in recent correspondence between Professor Bateson and Dr. Lewis Thomas, Professor Bateson made it very clear that he does not share the Minister's view that his evidence could be described as ''incontrovertible''. He believes that the issue of deer hunting should be decided on the basis of a proper balance between animal welfare, science and social, cultural and environmental factors. Any day now, the Durrell Institute for Conservation and Ecology is due to publish a study on the environmental impact of hunting. To deny an applicant, and, indeed, the tribunal, the opportunity to hear the latest and most relevant science and research is unjust and irrational. I hope that the Minister will therefore join us in resisting amendment No. 239. 
 Amendments Nos. 240 and 243 relate to circumstances in which the registrar, or the tribunal, is happy that the clause 8 tests for registration have been satisfied. The amendments would remove the provision enabling the applicant to consent to the addition or varying of conditions in the application. The amendment is yet another attempt by hunting opponents to erode the rights of applicants for registration, to the point where not only would the tests be extremely tight, but the bureaucracy would 
 become overwhelming. The clause already requires the registrar and the tribunal to be satisfied that the applicant passes the least suffering and utility tests. Therefore, if they want to vary the conditions specified in the application, they should have to seek the consent of the applicant. Indeed, they should not require the conditions to be varied at all. 
 The effectiveness, efficiency and moral authority of the proposed licensing regime will clearly rest on acceptance of the regime by those who will be licensed. That acceptance will require them to believe that they are being treated fairly, equitably and without prejudice. Amendment No. 240, and the other amendments tabled by the hon. Member for Wolverhampton, South-West, would in the eyes of many thousands of people, have the potentially catastrophic effect of bringing the law into disrepute. That would affect large sections of society, and undermine the whole basis of the new regime. We therefore strongly oppose the amendment.

Alun Michael: I have some sympathy with both views expressed on the amendment. It raises serious questions about how to deal with applications and conditions to applications. On one hand, we want applications to be properly understood by the applicants and to be properly observed. On the other hand, to tie the hands of the registrar and the tribunal so that they cannot require conditions even when they make sense would unduly fetter the tribunal. For instance, if an applicant were being awkward about a minor element in the application, it would seem over the top for the registrar and the tribunal to turn down the whole application.
 The problem is that the amendments appear to allow the registrar and tribunal the power to impose conditions as they see fit. In other words, they seem to go wide, rather than allowing the tribunal to act reasonably—in a way that would not cause problems for a reasonable applicant. That is why I have some sympathy with what has been said. The hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle is going to one extreme, saying that the registrar or the tribunal could be almost capricious, adding conditions and requirements that went further than the application that would be unreasonable. On the other hand, my hon. Friend the Member for Wolverhampton, South-West would virtually give the applicant the right to say that he would not accept any amendments to the application. Neither is a position that we want. 
 Amendments Nos. 240 and 243 seem reasonable because they would remove the need for the registrar to seek the consent of the applicant before imposing conditions on the application. However, they do not go as far as amendments No. 237 and 238, which raise the concerns expressed by the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle. Amendment No. 239 would change clause 15, which allows the Secretary of State to ''enable or require'' the registrar to permit the amendment of an appropriate application before the registrar to determine whether it passes the tests of utility and cruelty. The amendment would remove the words ''or require''. That would limit the freedom of the 
 Secretary of State to set procedures for the handling of applications. It is a technical drafting term; it will not prejudge decisions of the Secretary of State on how the registrar treats applications. 
 I think that I am right in saying that amendments Nos. 240 and 243 would allow a common-sense outcome. They would not unduly fetter the registrar and the tribunal, but would ensure that the more extreme type of conditions, about which the hon. Gentleman expressed fear, did not apply. 
 I hope that my hon. Friend the Member for Wolverhampton, South-West will not press the first three amendments, but if I understand them correctly, amendments Nos. 240 and 243, which we shall arrive at subsequently, could be accepted. On that basis, my hon. Friend might not pursue the other amendments, and amendments Nos. 240 and 243 could be moved formally when we reach that stage.

Lembit Öpik: Could the hon. Member for Wolverhampton, South-West describe as clearly as he can how he sees amendments Nos. 240 and 243 altering the role of the Bill? I heard what he said before, but I did not quite get it.

Rob Marris: I see amendments Nos. 240 and 243 as a fairly standard way of proceeding. I do not see the process in the same way as the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle. Tribunals can frequently impose conditions on an applicant; it is up to the applicant whether they accept them. Under the amendments, an applicant might say to a registrar, ''You've tried to impose these conditions without my consent. I don't like them and I'm withdrawing my application.'' At that point, the applicant might withdraw and then make another application—although I shall not reopen the debate about the costs of doing that. I do not believe that the applicant would have something shoved down their throat by the registrar. As I understand it, they would have a right to reapply, perhaps with additional information.
 To return to the points made by the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle, at a certain point in any judicial process, the door has to be closed to new evidence. I take his point about research coming forward, but at a certain point a registrar, or subsequently a tribunal, has to make a decision on the evidence before it. It is up to a registrar or a tribunal in standard proceedings to decide whether late evidence will be allowed. In our judicial system, that is commonly left to the discretion of the individual, the bench or whatever is dealing with that judicial process.

Gregory Barker: The hon. Gentleman may have better information than I do, but he paints a rather nightmarish picture of the hearings. It is conceivable that there will be a long delay beforehand, but one presumes that once the hearings start, they will be relatively brief and to the point; or does he expect each hearing to drag on, like a High Court case, for days or weeks?

Rob Marris: I certainly would not expect hearings to drag on, but if, for example, on the eve of a tribunal hearing an applicant produced 300 pages of research—
 or ''clinical evidence'', to use the favourite phrase of the hon. Member for North Wiltshire—I would imagine that two things could happen. The application might be withdrawn and resubmitted, or the hearing date might be postponed, but it would not be good for the system if that application hearing in front of a tribunal—before the registrar, it is a paper exercise—went ahead despite the sudden appearance of that amount of evidence.
 Hard as it may seem, one has to shut the door at some point and make a decision, particularly if an applicant, whether an individual or a group, can reapply. The Minister will say if I am wrong, but my understanding is that they could withdraw their application and resubmit it with fresh evidence.

Alun Michael: The trouble is that both sides of the coin are being discussed. A tribunal could be unduly oppressive by adding conditions that go a bit further than anyone would regard as reasonable. On the other hand, there is the possibility that an applicant would be unreasonable. Both of those points mean that there is the extreme option of saying, ''All right, we will turn you down even though there is only a sliver of difference between what the tribunal wants to do and what the applicant wants to do.'' On the other hand, it is possible to say, ''Take your application away and make a new one.'' Both of those positions seem unreasonable and we need to strike a happy medium. If my hon. Friend were to give me an opportunity before he concludes his remarks, I might be able to say something to help in reaching that outcome.

Rob Marris: I take the Minister's point. I do not want to prolong the debate unduly, but it is about the nature of justice in the way in which the system operates.

Lembit Öpik: To be brief, as I think that there will soon be a Division in the House, the hon. Gentleman is saying that the registrar could impose conditions, and, if the applicant agrees with them, the conditions will apply, which is great. If the applicant does not agree with the conditions, the case will probably be withdrawn. If I understand amendments Nos. 240 and 243 correctly, he is saying that the words
''with the consent of the applicant or applicants''
 are otiose because they do not add anything. I know that my hon. Friend the Member for Mid-Worcestershire will have the same concerns.

Rob Marris: The wording is not otiose. It makes a difference whether an applicant consents to the process. To use an analogy beloved by the hon. Member for North Wiltshire, if there were a planning application in an urban area, a local authority, as the planning authority, might say, ''Yes, you can erect a garage alongside your property, but you've got to paint the door green.'' The applicant might say, ''I don't want to paint the door green. I'll withdraw my application and come up with a fresh application in which, for example, the garage has a different elevation and is set further back from the road.'' Amendments Nos. 240 and 243 would remove the consent from the process, but would still leave the door open for an applicant either to accept conditions
 imposed unilaterally by a registrar or tribunal or to withdraw the application and resubmit it.

Alun Michael: I hope that this is helpful because the debate is proving to be interesting. We should all seek to get the balance right—hon. Members are seeking to do that—to make sure that there cannot be any misunderstanding about what is intended. There is a danger that there could be a situation in which a lay applicant said, ''I have the right to refuse changes to my application.'' On the other hand, we certainly do not want to create a situation in which the tribunal felt that it could be cavalier and unreasonable in imposing conditions.
 As I understand it from an earlier conversation, that is not what my hon. Friend is after. His amendments are concerned with making sure that an unreasonable person cannot hold up the whole process. If we were to accept amendments Nos. 240 and 243, they would allow the registrar and the tribunal to impose additional conditions under clauses 17 and 19. We have looked at that issue and drafted amendments to go with amendments Nos. 240 and 243 to tidy up the process in clauses 18, 24 and 25. As my hon. Friend suggests, we will end up with a situation in which the tribunal, while not going over the top, would seek to get the engagement of the applicant as a matter of good practice in agreeing amendments to the application in the knowledge that unreasonably withholding agreement to sensible conditions would lead to a rejection. In the light of the debate, I hope that my hon. Friend will not push amendments Nos. 237, 238 and 239 because amendments Nos. 237 and 238 will be unnecessary. The tabling of consequential amendments would tidy up the matter. We need to get to the point that my hon. Friend seeks, but without introducing unintended consequences that raise Opposition Members' concerns. That will take us to a balanced position rather than an unreasonable position or what appears to be an unreasonable position, which is in many ways equally important to lay applicants.

Rob Marris: I am grateful to my right hon. Friend for, as is often the case, coming up with a better route than me to our shared goal. On that basis, I seek formally to move amendments Nos. 240 and 243 and seek the Committee's leave to withdraw amendments Nos. 237, 238 and 239.

Marion Roe: The amendments that you wish to press will, of course, come later and can be moved formally then.

Rob Marris: Thank you, Mrs. Roe. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Clause 13, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 14Application on behalf of group

Clause 14 - Application on behalf of group

Andrew George: I beg to move amendment No. 263, in
clause 14, page 5, leave out lines 10 to 12.

Marion Roe: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
 Amendment No. 264, in 
clause 14, page 5, line 27, leave out from '28(5)' to end of line 30.
 Amendment No. 265, in 
clause 14, page 5, leave out lines 31 to 37.

Andrew George: I intend to be as brief as possible. The amendments have to been seen in the context of clause 2. They would make it a statutory requirement that every member of a group registration is registered and that each condition of registration is complied with. Each member would therefore be responsible for complying with the conditions of registration. As drafted, the Bill would allow unregistered individuals to participate in registered hunting, which would be less accountable. The amendments would ensure that each member has an interest in ensuring that their fellow members comply with all conditions of registration. Failure by any member to comply with any conditions would render the activity illegal.
 Those hon. Members who play other sports understand the importance of ensuring that all participants are registered, understand their responsibilities and are covered by insurance policies should something go wrong. It works both ways: I know that the hon. Members for Dumfries (Mr. Brown), for Worcester and for Loughborough (Mr. Reed) play, as I do, for the Houses of Parliament rugby, football and cricket teams. When I take part in those sports in my constituency, it is important that one is registered with the club and that the club is registered with the appropriate league. That means that one cannot simply go out and behave in an unsporting way. One cannot get red or yellow cards, which bring one's team into disrepute, and walk off without taking responsibility for the results of one's activities because one would have besmirched the good name of one's club. That approach would similarly apply to hunting. 
 The amendments deal only with hunt participants, who are those actively taking part in the act of hunting, and not hunt spectators, who view the event but do not take part in it. The key word is ''participation'', and it is clearly reasonable and just that all those who actively participate in such a serious activity should be fully accountable and responsible for their actions. The amendments aim to ensure that each and every member of the group going out hunting takes full responsibility. Consequently, each registered member must be aware of and comply with the conditions made on that hunt. If the Bill were left unamended, unregistered individuals could attend hunts as part of a group and not be fully accountable or responsible for their actions. For example, an unregistered individual who committed an act that breached a condition, possibly causing unnecessary suffering to a wild animal, could claim that they were not aware of the conditions laid down and consequently should not be prosecuted. Amendment No. 263 and the other amendments in my name would ensure equal accountability in the group, with each member being aware of the conditions laid down by the hunt. 
 The amendment would also encourage each member to have a keen interest in and an understanding of the conditions laid down, and ensure that members encouraged one another to adhere to those conditions. Fully accountable group registration would ensure that members of a hunt paid attention to the parameters within which they can hunt and encourage good practice by those attending.

James Gray: I hope that I am not doing the hon. Member for St. Ives a disservice by summarising the purpose behind the amendments as a proposal to require everyone who takes an active part in hunting to register. That is the thrust, broadly speaking. He made it clear that he includes in that not only those who are spectating, as he put it, but those involved in hunting itself. I shall return to hunting in a moment.
 The hon. Gentleman's point about the Bill not applying to those who are only spectating, or watching the hunt, may fall foul of the definition of people who are hunting in clause 45(2): 
''For the purposes of this Act a reference to a person hunting a wild mammal with a dog includes, in particular, any case where—
(a) a person engages or participates in the pursuit of a wild mammal''.
 We shall debate that provision later, but the definition seems rather loose and may include any person who, for example, is in the field following a hunt. It appears from the definition in clause 45 that anyone taking part in a hunt—anyone who is in the field or spectating—may be caught. As I understand it, that would also include people who might be following the hunt to disrupt or monitor it. The League Against Cruel Sports or anyone else who happened to be there would equally have to be registered. 
 My reading of clause 45, which we shall discuss on another occasion, is that anyone in any shape, size or form who is taking part in the activity of hunting can be described as ''hunting''. Therefore, if the hon. Gentleman's amendments were accepted, every person who might take part in such an event would have to be registered. 
 Even if that were not the case and we discovered that the definition of hunting means simply those actively in control of the dogs taking part in the hunt, the amendments mean that not only the master of the hunt, who takes charge of the event, and the kennel huntsman, who hunts the hounds, would have to apply separately for the same event, although the whippers-in, terrier men and everybody else involved would have to apply. 
 As many as 10 or 15 people may be engaged in the same activity with the same dogs in the same place on the same day, achieving the same utility, or lack of it, and the same cruelty, or lack of it. Every one of those 15 would have to make a separate application and would separately have to persuade the registrar that their proposed activity met the terms in the Bill. That seems to me to be a waste of time and money, and a waste of the registrar's time. If he is to grant permission for a particular group of dogs to hunt in a particular area at a particular time for a particular 
 reason of utility, surely that should apply to all those taking part in the hunting on that day.

Andrew George: The hon. Gentleman has made some important points. I agree that other parts of the Bill may require clarification, but does he accept that all those who participate and are not simply observing should, in some way, take on the responsibility of registration, be fully aware of that responsibility and have their names recorded as responsible people who are therefore eligible to take part in the activity?

James Gray: The hon. Gentleman is right that anyone who takes part in the activity of hunting should be ready to conform with the terms laid down by the registrar under the Bill. There is no suggestion that submitting a separate application, which would cause greater bureaucracy, would necessarily mean that the whipper-in for the Beaufort will, by virtue of that action, be more or less likely to conform. It would merely be a bureaucratic duplication of the application.
 Lastly, I refer to an earlier discussion about younger people taking part in hunting. The Minister went to some length to argue that it would be reasonable for younger people to take part if they were under supervision. However, if the amendments are accepted, that would no longer be possible and they would not be allowed to take part even if supervised. People would have to apply separately and be registered separately, no matter how old they are. The amendments are unnecessary, unduly bureaucratic and costly, so I hope that the hon. Gentleman withdraws his proposal.

Alun Michael: I think that the last point made by the hon. Member for St. Ives is correct in that one unintended consequence of the Bill, not only as drafted, but as amended by the Committee, which has exercised a mind of its own—I use that phrase entirely as a term of praise—may be that young people are precluded from the activity. However, one must distinguish between those who participate in hunting and those who merely follow—observers are not participants and are therefore not included in the number referred.
 The hon. Member for St. Ives makes an important point in the sense that people should be responsible. Even those who do not have legal responsibility for oversight of the activity should behave properly and consistently, and observe the rules and any indications given by the person supervising. That is all entirely reasonable, but the hon. Gentleman takes a sledgehammer to crack a nut. Under clause 15, several individuals may make a linked application to be jointly registered in respect of hunting by the same group of hunters and to supervise any unregistered hunters who may accompany them. The conditions that they set for those who go with them is part of the responsibility that then falls to them. 
 Amendments Nos. 263, 264 and 265 would remove the provisions to allow unregistered individuals to participate in supervised hunting. My fear is that that would greatly add to the bureaucracy and that it would be impractical. If every person who may from time to time be involved in the activity had to submit 
 an application to the registrar, it would open something of a Pandora's box of bureaucracy. 
 I shall treat amendment No. 263 as probing, and I assure the hon. Gentleman that there are safeguards in the process. In considering an application from persons seeking group registration, and to supervise hunting by a larger group of individuals, the registrar would be required to assess the fitness of the applications to be registered for the purpose. That includes their fitness to supervise others and to be able to ensure that the right requirements were placed on those whom they take with them in undertaking the activity. 
 The proposed activity would have to comply with the automatic conditions of registration in clause 28, and any other conditions that may be imposed. Those undertaking the activity must ensure that everyone involved observes those conditions, including the automatic requirement to minimise suffering. To grant the application, the registrar would have to be satisfied that there were sufficient registered individuals to ensure that the number of unregistered individuals could be properly supervised. Indeed, that is the point of ensuring that we know what numbers are being applied for.

Andrew George: I fully appreciate that it is not the intention, although I can see that it could be interpreted in such a way, for every new individual who wants to join in with a hunt to have to go through a fresh registration process. However, drafting changes could achieve improvements here. Is the Minister satisfied with the fact that, as it would be possible for unregistered members to participate in hunting, people might feel less responsibility for the process? That would be a less satisfactory outcome.

Alun Michael: I understand what the hon. Gentleman is after. It would be extremely regrettable, and certainly not our intention, if unregistered individuals were able to say, ''Fred is in charge, so anything that goes wrong is his fault. It does not matter how we behave.'' The safeguards in the Bill mean that registered persons who accepted people with such a cavalier attitude would know that they were putting their own registration at risk. They would therefore ensure that the people with them understood and observed the rules and conditions. That is not onerous. Indeed, it is normal to do that when taking groups of people mountain walking, and it applies also to pest control and other farming activities. It is common sense.
 What the hon. Gentleman seeks is required by common sense, but it would be underpinned by the system of conditions in other parts of the Bill. I hope that I have persuaded him that it will be achieved by the application of common sense and the checks and balances. 
 The number of unregistered persons who could be supervised by a registered person is not prescribed, as that is a matter to be assessed on the particular facts case by case. The larger the group, the more the issue of supervision arises, and the more the supervisor would have to explain the arrangements that are being put in place to ensure that people understand what 
 they have to do. There are various ways for the supervisor to satisfy the registrar or the tribunal. That seems straightforward, and it will settle down. It is for applicants to specify the maximum number of unsupervised individuals in the group and to show that they can be properly supervised. 
 I hope that I have satisfied the hon. Gentleman that the Bill takes care of the point about which he is worried and that there is no need to press the amendment.

Andrew George: I am much reassured by the Minister's response, and he understands the spirit in which the amendment was moved. I entirely take it on board that one could interpret the proposal as implying that every new individual would have to restart the registration process. However, that would be an unnecessarily vindictive and cynical method of discouraging the activity, and it is not my purpose. I want to ensure that individuals who take part in the activity with a registered hunt are fully aware of their responsibilities, and that the registered hunt itself should be protected to ensure that individuals with an oblique interest cannot simply turn up and bring that hunt into disrepute. I hope the Minister appreciates that it cuts both ways.
 I accept that such an interpretation could be put on the amendment, which is a potential weaknesses. Although I am prepared to withdraw it, I urge the Minister to consider whether we can look again at the parameters, perhaps in future debates, and whether he and his Department might table Government amendments to take account of the concerns that I have raised. Both sides of the argument need to be addressed to take an appropriate belt-and-braces approach to registration. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. 
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 6.15 pm

Marion Roe: In the light of the Committee's decision on amendment No. 31, I shall now put amendment No. 283 formally.
 Amendment made: No. 283, in 
clause 14, page 5, line 13, leave out '18' and insert '16'.—[Mr. Gray.]

James Gray: I beg to move amendment No. 33, in
clause 14, page 5, leave out line 25.
 In essence, under subsection (6), which covers the conditions for applications, the applicant must specify the maximum number of individuals who may hunt at any one time. The amendment would remove that specification, and I shall give the reasons for that.

[Mr. George Stevenson in the Chair]
 The precise meaning of the word ''hunt'' as it appears in subsection (6)(a) is open to interpretation. To some extent, the amendment is probing, and I believe that I am right in saying that what the Minister means by the maximum number of individuals who may hunt at any one time is those people who are actively involved in the hunting. That returns us to the issue that we were discussing earlier. 
 Certain people are in control of the dogs: the master, the whippers-in, the huntsman and perhaps the terrier men. They are the people who could be described as hunting, but the field, who are following, could not. That is my interpretation of the Minister's intention, although, as I mentioned earlier, clause 45(2) defines hunting as when 
''a person engages or participates in the pursuit of a wild mammal.''
 During a hunt, the hounds are up ahead. The master, the whippers-in and the huntsman are with the hounds, and the rest of the people are perhaps two, three or five fields away—or in my case, a great deal more than that, I am afraid. Would those people, who could be lost somewhere in the middle of the countryside and who would have no control over the dogs, be counted as people who are hunting? If so, it is important that subsection (6)(a) be removed, because it would require the applicant to specify the exact number of people who would be following the hunt on a particular Tuesday. If those people would not be counted as ''hunting'', we should, even so, consider the logic behind the amendment. 
 Let us assume—I hope that the Minister clarifies the point—that the Bill refers to the people who are in control of the dogs. If that is the case, that number would be very small—about six or, for a big hunt on a busy day, perhaps a maximum of 10. It could be argued that the more people who were controlling the dogs, the better. 
 It is a good idea to have a reasonable number of whippers-in controlling the hounds, particularly if the hunt is taking place in a built-up area or is approaching a road or a railway line. The whippers-in can be sent off to particular points and be told to ensure that, if the hounds come in their direction, they should send them back again so as not allow them into Mrs. Snooks's garden down the road or on to a road or a railway line. Therefore, a provision that appears to limit the maximum number of people taking part in the hunting seems to me to be wrong-headed. We should perhaps encourage as many people as possible to be in charge of the dogs, because that would make it more likely that the dogs will be controlled. 
 In that sense, the amendment is probing, but will the Minister clarify two things? First, will he confirm that the phrase ''who hunt'' means those people who are in control of the dogs, but not the spectators, the followers or the field? Secondly, if my understanding of that point is correct, why is it necessary to specify the maximum number of people who should be in control of the dogs? I believe that specifying a minimum would be better.

Peter Luff: If hunting is registered under the Bill and passes the utility test, the cruelty test and the suffering test, and if the provision for limited numbers is retained, it may be possible to prevent the hunt from going ahead by flooding it with saboteurs, who will be deemed to be hunting, and thus make the hunt illegal.

James Gray: My hon. Friend makes a good point. What would happen if a hunt registered to have a maximum of 10 people controlling the dogs, but a couple of others turned up and joined in, or pretended to join in? Saboteurs may try to do that, but a local
 farmer, for example, may shout an order at a dog to get it back in the main pack. At once, the number specified has gone up from the maximum of 10 to 11. Alternatively, the hunt could simply specify a ridiculously large number—100, for example—knowing that there would never be more than three or four present and that it would not exceed the maximum.
 What is the point of specifying a maximum number? If the Minister was seeking to ensure that the provision would not be abused, he may have thought, ''Well, perhaps a few hundred will turn up and pretend to be in charge of the dogs.'' That would be an obvious abuse, but it is covered by the fact that the word ''hunting'' would be restricted to people in charge of the dogs—by definition, a relatively small number. This probing amendment was tabled to discover why he wants an application to specify a maximum number.

Alun Michael: Thank you, Mr. Stevenson, and welcome back to the Chair.
 The hon. Gentleman correctly interprets the common-sense understanding of the clause, which is that those involved in hunting are the ones who count as being involved. That is slightly circular, but I hope that it reassures him. 
 In some respects, it could be argued that the number itself is not the issue as much as the disposal of those numbers in the responsibilities that they undertake. In giving examples, the hon. Gentleman illustrated the point. The applicants would have to show the numbers involved and what they intended them to do as part of their team. That might vary, depending on the type of country, the species being hunted and other factors relating to the territory, to which he referred. 
 The proposal places an onus on the applicants to ensure that there is a distinction between those who are directly engaged in hunting and those who are merely following the hunt and not taking part in the activity. The suggestion that a group of saboteurs could turn up and flood the hunt by pretending to be involved in the activity is a little imaginative. The distinction could easily be drawn. 
 Clause 14(6) sets out the conditions that an application on behalf of a group would be required to specify, and they must be considered together rather than separately. The amendment would remove the requirement to specify the maximum number that may hunt at any time, but requiring information on the number of persons who may hunt is needed for the good purpose of enabling the registrar to determine whether the proposed supervision would be adequate to ensure compliance with the registration requirements. 
 The provision would not put a ceiling on the number of people who may attend an event, but when a larger number wish to go out, the hunt must ensure that enough people who are registered with the group attend the event to achieve proper supervision.

James Gray: The Minister is speaking rather quickly and I want to be sure that I have understood what he
 means. I think he is describing a minimum and that he said that a minimum number must take part, but the Bill refers to a maximum.

Alun Michael: No, I said that the applicants would need to specify in their application that they had sufficient registered individuals to supervise the larger number that might be involved. Therefore, the matter of those whom the hunt would seek to include in the joint registration, as distinct from those who are unregistered but who go with them, depends on how they order their activities. It would be for applicants to show how they intend to organise their events.
 The hon. Gentleman talks of specifying a maximum as if a maximum was the controlling figure and as if that is all that is important, but it is not. The applicants would set down the maximum number of those involved and say, ''These are the individuals that we seek to register. This is how we will ensure the proper supervision of unregistered hunters involved in the activity.'' 
 The registrar would need to be satisfied that the number of registered hunters was sufficient for the supervision of the unregistered individuals. The maximum number of individuals will not be spelt out in statute, because the matter needs to be considered case by case, depending on the terrain and other factors, to which the hon. Member for Mid-Worcestershire referred. Judgments will be made using common sense and considering the intentions of the individuals who make the application. The clause makes it clear that individuals must demonstrate that they have arrangements in place to ensure compliance with the conditions of their registration.

James Gray: The Minister has made a useful contribution, because he identified a key matter of definition. Where the word ''hunting'' appears in the Bill, it refers specifically to those people who control the dogs. That is important, because previous Bills lacked clarity as to whether ''hunting'' means controlling the dogs or following the hunt in one way or another.
 I remain puzzled, however, if the notion is that a large number of unregistered people will go out to control the dogs, because it is extremely unlikely that a hunt would allow that. Unregistered people would be in the field following the hunt, not controlling the dogs. The huntsmen and whippers-in would control the dogs. I have never heard of any organisation allowing unregistered people to control the dogs.

Alun Michael: The hon. Gentleman is in danger of making the definition narrower than he intends. Those people who are merely following the hunt or spectating are clearly not hunting. The field—the people pursuing the animal—are participating. Saboteurs are not participating. To be hunting, one must have an intention to pursue the animal. In referring to registered individuals, he also referred to other activities that members of the team might undertake to ensure that the safety of the dogs and the public is maintained.

James Gray: The Minister has just changed what he said a moment ago. I said that we needed clarification
 of what ''to hunt'' means, and I said, at some length, that hunting means controlling the dogs. I listed the people who would be involved in that, such as the huntsmen, the kennelmen and the whippers-in. I said that it would be better to state the maximum rather than the minimum number of people involved and that the field, who might be some fields away, should not count in that number.
 The Minister has now chosen entirely to change his definition—after receiving a piece of paper from his officials, I note—of those who need to be registered. As I understood what he said just now, people in the field—those who are following the hounds on horses or on foot—may be some fields away, but under no circumstances would they be in control of the dogs, and those who are not taking part in venery, but just following and watching, albeit mounted, would not need to be registered. He now seems to be saying that they would.

Alun Michael: The hon. Gentleman is skilled at taking my response, narrowing it down further and then saying that I said it. The phrase ''in control of the dogs'' was his, not mine. I said that people following, as distinct from being directly involved in, the activity of hunting would not count in the numbers. It will be in the interests of those involved to clarify who is doing what. I suggest that the hon. Gentleman look back to the Official Report to see what he said and what I said, and not ascribe to me words that he used.

James Gray: We will look at the record extremely even carefully, but even now I am a little unclear. He is right in saying that I want to analyse what he said, down to the finest word and point, as that is the purpose of the debate. The Committee stage is designed to examine every point, so forgive me if I am too precise. The Minister can be a little slack in some of his language, and I am happy to pick him up if he is wrong.
 Even now, the Minister seems to be making a distinction between the people whom he describes as following the hunt and those who are actively involved in it. The phrase ''following the hunt'' is straightforward and in common usage. One could go to any one of 300 or 400 places in England, three or four days a week, to see it in action. In the hunt, there are the huntsmen, the master and the whippers-in, who are usually in different uniforms. Many are paid hunt employees. They control the hounds, decide where they go and feed and look after dogs all week. 
 Following the hunt at some distance—too far away in my case, as I tend to get lost—are people who wear a red or black coat and are members of the hunt, having paid a subscription. They are the followers. In addition to that, there are many other people, often amounting to hundreds, who travel in cars, on foot, on bicycles or motorcycles. There are a variety of people whom, one way or another, take part in and observe the hunt. As I observed last Saturday, there are often many people who are opposed to hunting. They, too, are dressed the part, wearing wellingtons and with mud up to the eyebrows. Last week, they followed us 
 all day; from the first thing in the morning to the last thing at night, we had a gang of about 10 members of the League Against Cruel Sports following us. Are they following the hunt or not?

Alun Michael: It may help the hon. Gentleman if he looked at clause 45 on interpretation, which makes the definition clear. Subsection (2) says:
''For the purposes of this Act a reference to a person hunting a wild animal with a dog includes, in particular, any case where . . . a person engages or participates in the pursuit of a wild animal, and . . . one or more dogs are employed in that pursuit (whether or not by him and whether or not under his control or direction).''
 The answer is clear. Hunt saboteurs are not pursuing the animal, and although they may be engaged in another activity, they are not hunting the animal. Similarly, if people are wandering along many fields behind observing the activity, they are not directly involved in the hunting. Further than that, the definitions have to be provided in the application, which specifies what the applicant has applied for.

James Gray: The Minister is heaping confusion on to confusion. I quoted clause 45 to him some time ago, so he does not need to refer me to it, and subsection (2) is the nub of his problem. I think that he intends to cover the hunt servants and staff—who are at the front—the field master who brings the field with him, and the people who are paying a subscription. I think that he does not intend to cover foot and car followers, the antis, and passers-by who happen to take an interest and watch it through binoculars. There will be a real problem in the courts with that definition.
 The Minister cannot get away from the problem, particularly as when we were discussing the point earlier he made it plain, until the civil servants intervened to correct him, that the Bill defined the people who were hunting as those who were in control of the dogs.

Alun Michael: Will the hon. Gentleman give way? He is misleading the Committee.

James Gray: I shall do so in a moment, but I want first to make my point.
 Not quarter of an hour ago, I went to some length to describe precisely how a day's hunting occurs and who is in control of the dogs. I made the point that we should find a minimum rather than a maximum, and the Minister seemed to agree at that stage. However, the record will show that he has changed his tack. He is now saying that under the 
''maximum number of individuals who may hunt at any time''
 specified in clause 14(6)(a), he includes not only the people who are controlling the dogs but also those who are following. His implication seems to be those who are following on horses. If not, it will be interesting to know whether he believes that people who follow on foot count as people who are hunting; in the case of one hunt that I was with recently, that was up to 1,000 people, some of whom were not part of the hunt but were opposed to hunting and were seeking to stop it. If they do, is it necessary for every one of them to be registered, or for the group registration to specify how many there will be?

Alun Michael: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for giving way, although we are now about a paragraph away from the point at which I tried to correct him. He again sought to ascribe to me his words. The hon. Gentleman, to use the phrase of the moment, is in control of his own words. He is not in control of my words, and I should be grateful if he left them alone. It is an attempt at spin. The record will show what each of us has said. One cannot hunt by accident. One must have an intention to pursue the wild mammal. The arrangements should make it clear who is participating and who is not. The Bill is clear; the hon. Gentleman should not continue in his attempt to confuse.

James Gray: There is no attempt to confuse. My speech to the amendment was precisely about clarifying about whom we are talking. The debate has been useful because the Minister has now explained that the people who hunt, the majority of whom have to be notified to the registrar, are those who are controlling the dogs—the hunt staff—and those who are following the hunt. He has still not specified whether, by ''followers'', he simply means subscribers to the hunt. In the case of my local hunt, the Beaufort hunt, that means 250 to 300 people on horses on a Saturday morning. They are reasonably easy to identify; most of them pay a subscription to the hunt. In addition, there can be another 1,000 people; on some days I have seen hundreds of cars. They follow one way or another. They keep an eye on where the hounds are and try to follow the hunt down the narrow lanes of Gloucestershire. They are definitely taking part. They get out of their cars every time the hounds stop and follow what is happening through their binoculars. They are seeking to follow the hunt.
 Does the Minister mean that for an applicant to achieve registration, he would need to specify the maximum number of people who would be following in that sense? Or does he mean just the number of people who follow on horses, or just those who are actually hunting with the dogs? He needs to be clear about that, because if it is the first, or even the second, it will be almost impossible for the hunt to know. There is no way for the applicant to know how many people are going to attend until the Saturday morning when he sees who turns up at the meet. I have seen some meets where I have been the only person out alone, and others where I have been one of a group of 250 people. If the Minister is saying that under subsection (6) the applicant must specify precisely how many people will be either in the mounted field or—even worse—among the foot followers, car followers and others associated with the hunt, he has set an impossible condition. No applicant could possibly state a maximum number. The Minister needs to be very precise when he defines what he means by hunting.

Rob Marris: The hon. Member for North Wiltshire has confused the issue, in that all St. Bernards are dogs, but not all dogs are St. Bernards. That is to say that not all those controlling dogs are hunting and not all who are hunting are controlling dogs. That is the difference between him and the Minister. Secondly—

James Gray: That is a precise summation of what I said. Not everyone controlling dogs is hunting and not everyone who is hunting is controlling dogs.

Rob Marris: We have made some progress. I would encourage the hon. Gentleman to withdraw the amendment because I think that he has read subsection (6)(a), which the amendment seeks to remove, out of context. One has also to read subsections (6)(b) and (6)(c). It is only when one looks at those that one understands why the maximum number should be included. Unless the Beaufort hunt, for example, specified the maximum number of individuals who may hunt at any time, it would be difficult, if not impossible, for the registrar to decide, when considering a group application, whether the provisions in clause 14(6)(b)
''arrangements to ensure compliance with the condition about records imposed by section 28(5)''
 have been met. 
 The example of Mrs. Snooks was cited. She is supposed, using a notepad in her kitchen, to keep track of 2,000 people who turn up for the Beaufort hunt in order to comply with the fourth condition in clause 28(5), which obliges her to keep a record of group registration. She is unlikely to be able to do that, and the registrar is unlikely to find it credible that she can do it either. He is likely either to impose a condition or to reject an application in terms of record keeping. Similarly, and perhaps more importantly, 14(6)(c) refers to ''arrangements for supervision.'' The registrar who is adjudging whether a group application should be issued must study the arrangements for the supervision of, for example, 2,000 people at the Beaufort hunt; some on bicycles, some on shanks's pony, some on real ponies, some on real horses and some in cars. It is only when considering 14(6)(b) and 14(6)(c) that the importance of 14(6)(a) becomes apparent. I support (b) and (c), although the hon. Member for North Wiltshire may not, and believe that (a) should be included. Therefore, I ask the hon. Gentleman to withdraw his amendment.

Peter Luff: This is a fascinating debate, although we seem to be having genuine definitional difficulties. I have sympathy with the Minister's objectives for the same reasons given by the hon. Member for Wolverhampton, South-West, but how do we define who is hunting? The Minister refers to clause 45(2) to reach that definition. However, although I do not hunt, my understanding is that those who hunt are the huntsmen, the masters and, above all, the dogs. What a mounted field does is in no sense hunting; it is following the field master. Those involved are spectators in the same way that hunt followers are spectators.
 I invite the Minister to think very hard about the definition, as it could create problems for him later. For example, very young children attend the first few minutes of some of the meets in my constituency and then immediately go home. Such people are clearly not hunting in any sense; they are there for the fun at the opening of the meet. Would such people have to be included in the ''maximum number of individuals''? Some people clear the first few jumps and then go home because they have had enough.

Gregory Barker: Between Christmas and the new year, I went out with my young family, and my seven-year-old son spent most of the hunt on the master's quad bike along with a gaggle of other young children. He was on the master's quad bike at the front of the hunt. Was he hunting?

Peter Luff: I think there are problems here, and the Minister must give them more careful consideration than he has; otherwise this will become the subject of considerable controversy in another place.

Alun Michael: I should reassure the Committee that there is no need to redraft the clause; some hon. Members are simply looking at it through the wrong end of the telescope. Clause 14 relates to an application that is made to undertake a particular activity. One cannot hunt by accident; one must have an intention to pursue the wild mammal. The applicants must say what numbers will be involved and how they plan to dispose of them. The hon. Member for Mid-Worcestershire, not I, referred to those in control of dogs. Of course that is bound to be a part of the activity, but it depends on all sorts of circumstances; whether it is at the beginning or at the end or just a part of the activity. The definition of hunters is in clause 45(2), and it is for people in the application to demonstrate what they will do.
 It is not for me to say what the Beaufort hunt will do. The point is that people should make clear on the application who will undertake the intentional activity of hunting, how many they intend to involve and how they intend to make reasonable arrangements for supervision. It is sensible for those who make applications to make clear how they will distinguish those people from those who will just be in the area or watching through binoculars; those individuals whom it would be silly to include in the numbers to be registered. It is for the applicants to indicate how they will make those distinctions and to make clear whom they will allow to be part of the activity of hunting. 
 All the other matters are not relevant to the Bill. In making their day-to-day arrangements, filling in their application or presenting their case to the registrar or tribunal, people may need to think the matters through, but they are outside the type of detail that we should be considering under the Bill.

James Gray: I shall not delay the Committee, but this is a central part of the way in which the system will work. The purpose of the Bill is to assess the cruelty against the utility of the use of dogs to hunt other mammals. We do not agree with it, but none the less that has been agreed under clause 8. Does the practice have utility? Is cruelty associated with it? [Interruption.] The hon. Member for Southampton, Test is making hand signals, but it is reasonable for the registrar to assess the activity of the dogs. It is reasonable for him to ask what the dogs will do and whether the utility of that will be greater or lesser than the cruelty that may be involved in it, or vice versa.
 I am perfectly content with the sequential tests; I am not talking about that. The nature of the Bill is to consider the two tests of whether the practice has utility and whether cruelty is associated with it. That is 
 the purpose behind the Bill. In other words, we should consider what the dogs do. Is there any purpose in what they do? 
 In addition to the dogs and what they do, and the people who control the dogs and what they do, the Minister now seems to have included in the application for registration other people who have no control whatever over the dogs and what they do. I am thinking of the person who is five fields away and the pedestrians and people in cars going past, watching through their binoculars. That is why a central point is that the courts will have huge fun over this. Do we register the maximum under this part of the Bill as hundreds of people, or do we register simply the people who control the dogs?

George Stevenson: Order. I hesitate to intervene, but I hope that the hon. Gentleman is coming to the end of his remarks, because he has, quite rightly, advanced these arguments previously while I have been in the Chair. I am a little concerned about that.

James Gray: I am indeed coming to the end of my remarks, Mr. Stevenson, but it must be understood that the registrar, who is required to consider the maximum number, will be bemused by the definition of the words ''to hunt''. The definition in clause 45 is wildly inadequate, despite the Minister shaking his head. The courts have a long job ahead of them in trying to take decisions on that, so it is very important that we should agree to the amendment.
 Question put, That the amendment be made:—
The Committee divided: Ayes 6, Noes 19.

Question accordingly negatived. 
 Clause 14, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Clause 15 ordered to stand of the Bill.

Clause 16 - Renewal of application

Michael Foster: I beg to move amendment No. 178, in
clause 16, page 6, line 10, leave out 'six' and insert 'twelve'.

George Stevenson: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
 Amendment No. 179, in 
clause 16, page 6, line 13, leave out 'six' and insert 'twelve'.
 Amendment No. 180, in 
clause 16, page 6, line 16, leave out 'six' and insert 'twelve'.
 Amendment No. 181, in 
clause 16, page 6, line 19, leave out 'six' and insert 'twelve'.
 Amendment No. 182, in 
clause 16, page 6, line 23, leave out 'six' and insert 'twelve'.

Michael Foster: I rise briefly in support of these amendments. Although we will not be able to debate amendment No. 177, which relates to clause 24, it may be worthwhile for the Committee to know the context of amendments Nos. 178 to 182.
 If renewals of application are needed, we should not overburden the system by flooding it with a mass of such renewals. That is one reason for changing the period before a renewal can be made from six months to 12 months. A second reason is that many of the utility tests are seasonal and can change significantly only over a period of 12 months. For example, if we consider predation on livestock, it would be difficult for the registrar to make a judgment if circumstances had not changed between one application and the renewal of that application. A six-month period is not long enough to allow significant changes; a 12-month period would be far better. Similar arguments could be advanced concerning food for livestock, and crops. 
 A third reason for the change from six months to 12 months is that it would create a buffer that would act as a deterrent to those who would wish to break their agreements and go against the principles of the Bill. For example, if the period were only six months and an application to hunt foxes were refused in March, another application could be made in September. However, that period is the close season for foxhunting.

James Gray: There is no such thing as a close season for foxhunting.

Michael Foster: I am glad that the hon. Gentleman has made that point because it is very useful. I have no doubt that it will come back to haunt him. I am aware that the close season is voluntary and that cub hunting starts around August and goes through to November, when the foxhunting season officially begins. However, I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for saying, on the record, that there is no such thing as a close season for foxhunting.

James Gray: I am sorry to interrupt again, but the hon. Gentleman may have understood me wrongly. He suggested that there was such a thing as a close season for hunting, as there is, for example, for pheasant shooting. The law lays down that pheasant shooting may not occur after 1 February, or whenever it is. Under the law, there is no such thing as a close season for hunting. Any close season happens entirely by voluntary agreement between the hunt and the farmers who are with the hunt.

Michael Foster: I accept what the hon. Gentleman says about the voluntary code with regard to a close season and the reasons the hunts give for having ''the close season'' rather than a piece of legislation.
 To return to the six-month period, suppose that there was a refusal in March and that the renewal could be heard again in September. If the individual 
 wanted to hunt foxes only in the official foxhunting season, there would be no loss to him, as he would not be able to conduct the activity anyway, whether he had a permit or not. To change the period from six months to 12 months would mean that the threat of cancellation of the registration would act as a deterrent and would enforce the system. People would think twice before breaking laws such as the Protection of Animals Act 1911, which would disqualify an individual from being registered to hunt. That 12-month period allows more time in which to consider whether the individual concerned qualifies for the renewal. I do not put forward that argument to stop people renewing; it would have been easy to propose a period of 10 years instead of six months. I have no intention of doing that, and want the legislation to be fair. I encourage hon. Members to support the amendments.

Lembit Öpik: The hon. Gentleman said that there was not an implication of a deterrent in extending the period to 12 months. To use my constituency as an example, the overwhelming majority of people who go hunting there do so in the belief that it is a form of pest control. The proposals would be to prejudge why their applications were turned down. With the best will in the world, some people will not get their applications right and might be refused on technical grounds. It seems harsh to punish those people for submitting in good faith something that is not up to muster, perhaps because they do not have the resources that the prescribed animal welfare bodies have, in terms of a grant. Six months is perfectly reasonable.

Michael Foster: Would the hon. Gentleman consider looking further at clause 17(4), which details reasons why the registrar may not give a permit to take part in pest control activities? Clause 17(4) refers to convictions for offences under the Bill, the 1911 Act and the Wild Mammals (Protection) Act 1996. Applicants might not have their registration given in six months and have to wait 12 months due to such criminal offences, rather than their not having filled out their form correctly or not having received the right legal help.

Lembit Öpik: But why punish the innocent for the crimes that the guilty have committed? As they are currently phrased, the amendments do not propose a differentiation between those who have been refused for reasons of offences and those who are refused for innocent error.

Rob Marris: An individual can always withdraw an application if the registrar says that it is incomplete.

Lembit Öpik: That may be so, but why let those people live in fear? I assume that those people are good and that they act in good faith. It is up to the registrar to make his judgments; 12 months sounds a little harsh to me.

James Gray: I am extremely puzzled by the motivation behind the amendments. The hon. Member for Worcester seemed to say that if someone had committed an offence under one of the acts mentioned in clause 17(4), that person should not reapply for 12 months. It does not matter whether that period is six months, 12 months or 10 years; if that
 person has committed one of those offences, he will not be registered anyhow. The length of time between the applications is irrelevant if the applicant has committed those offences. More important than that, the hon. Gentleman entirely misunderstands—

Michael Foster: Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

James Gray: I shall continue, as we are about to vote. The hon. Gentleman misunderstands the reasonable length of time between applications. That is dependent on the times of the hunting season; that is, when we hunt with hounds. When we hunt foxes with hounds, we avoid those times when the foxes are pregnant. That is in sharp distinction to those people who shoot foxes, who mainly do so when the vixens are pregnant. Hunting people avoid doing so, because they want to allow the cubs to be born.
 Sitting suspended for a Division in the House. 
 On resuming—

George Stevenson: When hon. Members have resumed their seats—they are lucky that we did not sell them—we will continue our debate on amendment No. 178.

James Gray: To recap, I was speaking against the amendment, which requires the word ''six'' to be changed to ''twelve''. The amendment is unnecessary. It would achieve nothing in particular, but would have several important downsides. The main justification that the hon. Member for Worcester gave for the amendment seemed to be that, because applicants had been convicted under one of the Acts listed in clause 17(4), they should not be able to make a new application for a period of 12 months. From my reading of clause 17(4), the conviction of an offence under, for example, the Protection of Animals Act 1911 would remain an obstacle to that applicant for life, and not for a particular application.

Alun Michael: I do not understand where the hon. Gentleman thinks the Bill says that there should be exclusion for life. He may be assuming that provisions in the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 do not apply, but they do.

James Gray: The Bill as drafted says that an applicant may be refused for certain matters
''specified in subsection (4).
 Those matters are 
(c) conviction for an offence under the Wild Mammals (Protection) Act 1996''
 among other things. I am sure that anybody who carried out such an offence would be rehabilitated. None the less, he would be convicted for it and, as the Bill reads, one conviction would last for life. If one is convicted for an offence under that Act, one is banned from making any more applications for life. That is how the Bill reads at present. No mention is made of rehabilitation. 
Alun Michael indicated dissent.

James Gray: The Minister is shaking is head. Is he of the view that, having been convicted of an offence under part 4, it lasts for a certain amount of time, after which one can re-apply? That is an extremely interesting insight into the Government's thinking. That is not what the Bill states, which seems to say that should people be convicted of such offences, they would not be allowed to re-apply. I should be happy to hear the Minister say that the time was limited.

Alun Michael: I am happy to clarify the matter. It does not need to be stated in the Bill because that is the way in which the legislation works. The Rehabilitation of Offenders Act would apply to previous offences such as those listed in clause 17(4). After a relevant period of time—usually seven years—convictions are treated as if they had never happened. This legislation would be no different.

James Gray: Right. That is extremely interesting. The Minister says that if one is convicted under one of the Acts specified, the rehabilitation Act kicks in after about seven years and it no longer counts against one. If that is the case, it does not matter whether the re-application period is six months or 12 months. The hon. Member for Worcester used the question of conviction under the Act as justification for changing the period of disqualification from six to 12 months. The Minister's intervention blows that argument out of the water.
 The difficulty is that, if one applied for a licence to hunt of any type, presumably in the autumn, and that application were turned down for some reason—it need not be a major reason, but some small technical matter—if one is not allowed to apply for a further 12 months, one would miss the following season. Therefore, people should be allowed to apply after six months to be able to catch the following season. If they were not in a position to do that, how would they maintain their packs of hounds for the period? Twelve months is an excessively long time to ask people to maintain their packs of hounds in the vague hope that they might be given registration under the Act. 
 There seems to be very little upside to the amendment. Changing the re-application date to 12 months will not reduce cruelty or increase utility. The tests will be equally applicable at six, 12, 18 months or any other period. All the amendment would do is to make it extremely difficult for any applicant to survive in the interim. After all, the hon. Member for Worcester must also bear in mind that, given the likely complexity of the application procedure, it is likely that it will take longer than six months. Therefore, it would be only reasonable to allow the applicant to make the application—not to have it considered—after six months, because it may take much longer for a decision to be made.

Alun Michael: I am still slightly puzzled by the hon. Gentleman's point. If the application has been turned down because the applicant, or one of the applicants, is disqualified through having a conviction, that is only one of several reasons why an application may be refused. In those circumstances, it is the length of disqualification under the legislation that is relevant, be it seven years or a different period.
 If that is the point that the hon. Gentleman made, it is irrelevant whether a new application cannot be made for six or 12 months. I accept his point, but that is not what the clause that he seeks to amend is about.

James Gray: Of course I was not making that point; it was his hon. Friend the Member for Worcester who said that being disqualified because of a conviction for an offence is the important point. The Minister is agreeing with me that, because it takes seven years to become rehabilitated, it makes no difference at all as to whether the legislation should state six or 12 months.

Alun Michael: That is deeply worrying. However, I understood my hon. Friend the Member for Worcester to be referring to situations that would preclude an application from succeeding, one of which is the fact that there is a live conviction. That conviction would be live as long as it is live; that is the piece of string issue. Having identified what the hon. Gentleman was trying to say, I hope that we can put the issue to one side and look at the question of applications that have been turned down before a fresh application can be made. That is key to the amendment.
 No reasonable person would disagree that some period should be allowed to elapse before someone who has been refused registration may reapply. How long that should be will be a matter of judgment for the Committee and the House. My initial view is that six months might be a reasonable period for that purpose. We must balance the need to avoid burdening the tribunal with applications that are likely to be unsuccessful because nothing new can be said about them. However, we must treat applicants fairly who may have overcome the objections that led to the refusal of registration in the first place, or those who may have entirely fresh evidence to present to the registrar and the tribunal for consideration. 
 Clause 16(6)(b) gives the registrar discretion to permit a repeat application within a shorter period where there is a material change of circumstances. That paragraph provides a useful safety valve. That leads me to think that there is something in the argument made my hon. Friend the Member for Worcester that six months is too short a period for new circumstances to arise. Twelve months is also quite short. Therefore, subsection (6)(b) means that it might be reasonable to change the period from six to 12 months, provided there is evidence so persuasive that the registrar and the tribunal could conclude that an application is appropriate. In the light of that, I am inclined, if the Committee is so minded, to accept my hon. Friend's amendments.

Michael Foster: I am very grateful to the Minister for his remarks. To pick up on comments that the hon. Member for North Wiltshire made, part of my initial argument was based on a wish to avoid flooding the system with renewal applications, especially given what I have tabled in amendment No. 177. That relates to clause 24, which we shall not talk about now. My second point concerned the suitability of some of the evidence that might be used, where it to come to the utility test. I would have thought that the extension to a 12-month period would work in favour of those seeking the renewal of a permit because they would
 have a greater opportunity to obtain evidence and make their case.
 I am grateful to my right hon. Friend for pointing out the catch-all emergency situation in subsection (6)(b). Should any unforeseen circumstances arise—for example, if a mass of hares were suddenly to run riot and deprive farmers of their crops—the registrar can take them into account. 
 I am grateful for what my right hon. Friend said and I look forward to the Committee's support. 
 Question put, That the amendment be made:—
The Committee divided: Ayes 18, Noes 4.

Question accordingly agreed to. 
 Amendments made: No. 179, in 
clause 16, page 6, line 13, leave out 'six' and insert 'twelve'.
 No. 180, in 
clause 16, page 6, line 16, leave out 'six' and insert 'twelve'.
 No. 181, in 
clause 16, page 6, line 19, leave out 'six' and insert 'twelve'.
 No. 182, in 
clause 16, page 6, line 23, leave out 'six' and insert 'twelve'.—[Mr. Foster.]
 Clause 16, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 17 - Determination by registrar

Diana Organ: I beg to move amendment No. 246, in
clause 17, page 7, line 3, after 'satisfied', insert 
 'beyond a reasonable doubt by the applicant or applicants'.

George Stevenson: With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment No. 247, in
clause 19, page 7, line 43, after 'satisfied', insert 
 'beyond a reasonable doubt by the applicant or applicants'.

Diana Organ: Although I seek to make amendments to part 2, I am not at all convinced about the licensing system, as my hon. Friend the Member for Falmouth and Camborne (Ms Atherton) stated earlier today. I am not convinced that one can licence cruelty. I reserve my judgment until the Bill is on Report. My right hon. Friend the Minister, as is usual with him, has made the importance of the tests of cruelty and utility absolutely clear. Indeed, they are at the heart of the Bill. Applicants have to prove that there is a legitimate reason for their activity and that the method
 that they are applying to use is less cruel than alternatives such as lamping and shooting.
 The aim of these simple, probing amendments is to seek reassurance from my hon. Friend the Minister about the strength of the tests for cruelty and utility and to ensure that the registrar has the certainty necessary to implement the tests fully and rigorously.

James Gray: We are not content with the amendments because we believe them to be draconian. The word ''satisfied'' means that the current standard of proof must be on the balance of probabilities, which it is perfectly reasonable to seek in civil cases and is used by existing registration and tribunal systems. The amendments would raise the standard, which we believe would be inappropriate in a jurisdiction of this kind.
 Case law says plainly that the more serious the issue, the more cogent the evidence must be. Clause 8 already sets a higher standard than usual by the use of the words ''serious'' and ''significant'', which we sought to have removed in earlier debates. As we know, the criminal standard of beyond reasonable doubt is inappropriate for a system of civil registration. Therefore, I hope that the Minister will be ready to resist an unnecessary and draconian strengthening of the clause.

Alun Michael: The hon. Gentleman will have heard my hon. Friend the Member for Forest of Dean say that she tabled the amendments to probe the way in which the tests would be applied and the registrar and tribunal would be satisfied before they granted an application. I do not want to reopen previous debates, but I believe that my hon. Friend could not be with us when we discussed what clause 8 would do. I am happy to assure her that the Bill does not introduce a system that would license cruelty. It does the reverse, by ensuring that hunting can be undertaken as defined in the first part of clause 8 only if it can be shown to be the method that involves the least likelihood of suffering. The clause is relevant, because it contains the requirement on which the registrar and the tribunal must be satisfied. I hope to satisfy my hon. Friend that that is the appropriate and correct level of proof to require before an application is granted.
 The hon. Gentleman's reference to the balance of probabilities was right in one sense but wrong in another. It was right in that the balance of probabilities rather than the criminal burden of proof of beyond reasonable doubt must be satisfied, but the registrar, or the tribunal, must be satisfied; their decision is not taken on the toss of a coin. They must say, ''I must be satisfied that the conditions are met. I cannot simply think that they might be.'' That is probably the most important point to make to my hon. Friend. 
 The test to be applied by the registrar and the tribunal must be the same, or the system will be inconsistent and confusing. The test is laid out in clause 8, which we have debated at great length. When considering an application for registration or an appeal, the registrar and the tribunal must decide on 
 the basis of the evidence provided by the applicant, together with any evidence provided by the designated animal welfare organisation, whether the proposed hunting meets the two tests in clause 8. On appeal, the registrar and the tribunal will decide whether hunting can go ahead. It is for the applicant to demonstrate that he meets the tests in clause 8. The applicant must satisfy the registrar, or the registrar must refuse the application. They must meet those tests to the satisfaction of the tribunal or the tribunal must refuse the application. I assure hon. Members that the amendment is unnecessary. The requirement that the registrar and the tribunal are satisfied that the two tests are met before any proposed hunting can be registered provides the necessary safeguards. 
 ''Beyond reasonable doubt'' is the test applied in criminal law, which is why it would be inappropriate for the registrar or the tribunal. We have deliberately chosen to use a tribunal system because it is simple, straightforward and efficient, and because it is a quick way to ensure that there is no doubt about the outcome of applications. The civil burden of proof is therefore appropriate. Prescribing the extent to which the tribunal must be satisfied is not consistent with what happens in other tribunals, and it would be inappropriate to set the tribunal apart in that way. 
 The purpose of establishing a tribunal to hear appeals is to ensure that appeals are dealt with by a mechanism that is publicly recognised as being inquisitorial rather than adversarial, which is the system used in criminal law. On a number of occasions today, we have examined situations in which the registrar and tribunal would have to be satisfied if they were to approve an application. I hope that my hon. Friend the Member for Forest of Dean will accept that the whole system provides the right balance—challenging and tough, but fair—and does not require the introduction of the belt and braces approach, which is borrowed from the criminal law, in the amendment. I hope that she is satisfied that we have got the balance right in the way in which the Bill is drafted.

Diana Organ: As I said earlier, the amendment is a probing amendment. I am grateful to the Minister for his assurances on the level of certainty required to convince the registrar that an applicant meets the tests. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Andrew George: I beg to move amendment No. 250, in
clause 17, page 7, line 14, at end insert— 
 '( ) conviction for an offence under the Protection of Badgers Act 1992 (c.51), 
 ( ) conviction for any other offence (whether or not in, or under the law of, England and Wales) which appears to relate to animal welfare and to be similar in character to an offence under any of those enactments,'.

George Stevenson: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments:
 No. 251, in 
clause 17, page 7, line 17, leave out 'and'.
 No. 287, in 
clause 17, page 7, line 18, leave out paragraph (e).
 No. 252, in 
clause 17, page 7, line 20, at end insert 
 '; and 
 ( ) any other relevant matter relating to the applicant or any of the applicants.'.
 No. 227, in 
clause 28, page 11, line 18, after '(c.27)', leave out 'or' and insert ','.
 No. 253, in 
clause 28, page 11, line 19, at end add 
 ', the Protection of Badgers Act 1992 (c.51) or the Protection of Wild Mammals (Scotland) Act 2002 (asp6).'.
 No. 254, in 
clause 32, page 12, line 35, leave out 'or' and insert— 
 '( ) a conviction for an offence under the Protection of Badgers Act 1992 (c.51), 
 ( ) conviction for any other offence (whether or not in, or under the law of, England and Wales) which appears to relate to animal welfare and to be similar in character to an offence under any of those enactments,'.
 No. 255, in 
clause 32, page 12, line 37, at end insert 
 ', or 
 ( ) any other relevant matter relating to the applicant'.
 No. 256, in 
clause 33, page 13, line 11, leave out 'or'
 No. 257, in 
clause 33, page 13, line 12, at end insert 
 ', or 
 ( ) the Protection of Badgers Act 1992 (c.51), 
 or the individual is convicted of an offence (whether or not in, or under the law of, England and Wales) which appears to relate to animal welfare and to be similar in character to an offence under any of those enactments'.
 No. 258, in 
clause 34, page 13, line 19, leave out 'or'.
 No. 259, in 
clause 34, page 13, line 21, at end insert 
 ', or 
 (c) by reason of any other relevant matter relating to him, that individual is no longer a fit and proper person to be registered'.

Andrew George: Likewise, I shall be brief. The amendments raise the key issue of tidying up the Bill in relation to other wildlife legislation. I hope that the Minister will accept that other areas of wildlife legislation may be relevant in judging whether previous convictions might disqualify an individual applicant. I seek consistency across all appropriate legislation on the disqualification for registration of a particular individual. On amendment No. 252, for example, when the registrar determines applications, he should be empowered to consider ''any other relevant matter'' and should not be restricted to considering those matters specified or restricted by clause 17(4).
 With regard to the other amendments, in determining an application the registrar must have regard to the fitness of the applicant. In that respect, they must consider whether the applicant has 
 convictions or offences under existing animal welfare legislation. The amendments include statutes not currently included in the Bill, which lists some key pieces of legislation under which convictions are directly relevant to determining an application. It is, however, vital that convictions under other pieces of legislation are taken into consideration. I hope that the Minister will accept at least the spirit of the amendments.

Peter Luff: I should be interested to hear the hon. Gentleman justify amendment No. 252 in more detail. It would make the other amendments irrelevant. It is the kitchen sink amendment; it covers everything.

Andrew George: The hon. Gentleman has made a decent point. The purpose of the range of amendments is not like a scattergun, in the hope that the Minister will accept one of them. We could deal either with a catch-all amendment that covers all legislation or with one that concerns with specific details. It would be helpful if the Bill covered other legislation. It is possible for an individual to have had a recent conviction for badger baiting, for example, or for committing an offence under the Protection of Wild Mammals (Scotland) Act 2002, but because such offences are not covered by the Bill, the registrar could not determine that that person would not qualify for registration. I hope that the Minister will take such matters on board.

James Gray: I shall deal first with the amendments tabled by the hon. Member for St. Ives. It seems difficult to justify them under the law. They would extend the definitions that allow the registrar to turn down applicants unreasonably.

Alun Michael: I note that the hon. Gentleman has only just started making his remarks but, in fairness, I must say that the hon. Member for St. Ives did not defend some of his amendments. I may assist the hon. Member for North Wiltshire when I respond in a way that will not leave him unhappy. I want to make him happy, and I shall do so when I reply to the amendments.

James Gray: Had the Minister given me the opportunity to finish my remarks, he would have realised that I was about to say that I reject the amendments in principle—especially amendment No. 252 to which my hon. Friend the Member for Mid-Worcestershire referred—because they are unacceptable. I am confident that he will deal with the amendments.
 However, amendment No. 287, tabled in my name, is significantly more important than those tabled by the hon. Member for St. Ives. It would delete subsection (4)(e) and remove a serious legal anomaly from the clause. As it is drafted, the registrar can refuse an application because another individual might want to hunt in reliance on that other person's registration. It is unfair to label an applicant as not being a fit and proper person to be registered just because another individual might seek to hunt in reliance on his registration. That may be a relevant matter for consideration when dealing with an application for renewal or deregistration, but it is 
 premature to restrict an individual's liberty on the basis of what someone else might do in the future. 
 The provision will offend every principle of justice. Why should an individual, having passed the utility or least suffering test, be refused registration on the basis of another person's suitability at an unknown future point? In law, a person is not judged on the basis of what a third party has done or may have done. It would be like refusing a shotgun licence to someone just because another person had broken the law and might want to use the gun. The existing clause is nonsensical and illiberal. It is difficult to justify under the law.

Alun Michael: I appreciate the spirit of the amendments tabled by the hon. Member for St. Ives. It is of benefit to the Committee that he did not launch into a defence of some of them. I intervened on the hon. Member for North Wiltshire partly in relation to a conversation about what the amendments would achieve. He made a good point. The Bill does not cover several legislative provisions. For example, the Protection of Animals (Scotland) Act 1912 mirrors the provisions of the Protection of Animals Act 1911. It would be nonsense for someone who had been convicted under the 1911 Act to be precluded from making an application, when someone who had been convicted under the 1912 Act could go to the local area and make a successful application. That would be contradictory. I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for raising the point.
 I have some reservations, to put it mildly, about the idea of a catch-all provision that takes into account almost anything. I appreciate that the hon. Gentleman was saying, ''Let us draft a provision that would ensure that, if certain matters were left out of the Bill unintentionally, they would be caught.'' I have asked my officials and legal advisers to look again at the legislation to which the amendments refer and at what might have been inadvertently omitted to ensure that the provision is consistent and includes the relevant legislation. The hon. Gentleman referred also to the Protection of Badgers Act 1992, which is another good example. 
 We have tabled some amendments that cover a comprehensive list of legislation, under which conviction would lead to disqualification. I accept that such discussions will depend on our timetable and, if we do not have enough time, we will correct the matter on Report. One way or the other, we will deal with the issue that has properly been raised by the hon. Member for St. Ives. I hope that he accepts that we must avoid a vague catch-all phrase. Indeed, as he remarked, we must make sure that we have a correct and comprehensive list of statutes.

Rob Marris: I refer the Minister to the second limb of amendment 250, which deals with
''conviction for any other offence''.
 The Minister mentioned a comprehensive list, for example the Protection of Animals (Scotland) Act 
 1912. It is impossible to draw up a comprehensive list in the case of someone who had committed an animal welfare offence in another country, for which he had been convicted. We would not be able to put in our legislation references to a myriad of other countries' legislations and a portmanteau might be needed.

Alun Michael: That should not be the trigger for disqualification. However, if there were information of that sort about an individual, it would be relevant to an application for registration made by that individual. It could well be a part of the evidence that was brought forward. I recall some long and complicated debates on the sex offences legislation and sex offences against children abroad. They were concerned with ensuring that the intention of catching those who have committed offences abroad was not frustrated in any way. My heart was with the spirit of the debates, but I had to accept that there were dangers in such arguments, particularly when offences might be set against a different standard of proof or evidence. I understand what my hon. Friend said. I hope that my reply will satisfy him that circumstances in such cases should be taken into account; especially blatant circumstances.
 As for the amendment tabled by the hon. Member for North Wiltshire, I shall expand on the matter perhaps outside the Committee, but if the registrar knows that an applicant's close friend has many convictions for cruelty and that they always hunt together, it would be irresponsible for him to grant registration. That is the sort of case that is meant to be caught under clause 17(4)(e), and that is why I resist the deletion of that paragraph. 
 I hope that the hon. Member for St. Ives will accept my assurances that we will deal that the point he has raised so well either later in Committee or on Report, depending on circumstances.

Andrew George: I am grateful to the Minister for his response, and am glad that he has made it clear to the Committee that he will bring forward Government amendments. He tells us that he has begun the process of tabling amendments that would effect the same changes as those intended by mine. I fully accept that amendment No. 252 was a catch-all; I had not read it in the same way as other hon. Members have done. Perhaps it could give rise to a registrar taking exception to the colour of people's eyes or the way that they dress. I am sure many hon. Members' staff contracts say at the end, ''and any other duties'', and I intended my amendment to have a similar function; I did not mean it to be unreasonable. The Minister clearly accepts the principle behind my amendments. I look forward to the Government amendments being tabled, and I suspect that I shall strongly support them. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Further consideration adjourned.—[Mr. Ainger.] 
 Adjourned accordingly at four minutes to Eight o'clock till Thursday 30 January at five minutes to Nine o'clock.